A Personnel, Equipment, and Vehicle-Focused Look at July 15

According to the official statement made by the Turkish General Staff on July 21, 2016, only 8,651 military personnel participated in the alleged coup attempt. Of this number, only 5,761 were professional military personnel, 1,676 were non-commissioned officers/privates, and 1,214 were military cadets. The same statement emphasized that only a very small portion of the Turkish Armed Forces’ (TSK) inventory of weapons and equipment was used during the incidents. The total number of individuals involved made up only about 1.5% of the entire Turkish military. A significant portion of that 1.5% consisted of military cadets with no operational capacity. At the time of the events, the total number of TSK personnel was approximately 570,000. This included 247,196 professional military personnel and 270,970 conscripts and other personnel.

Although the TSK inventory includes Self-Propelled Howitzers, Fırtına Howitzers, and Armored Recovery Vehicles—all of which are armored—none of these were used. The primary vehicles that could be used in a coup would be tanks, armored combat vehicles, or armored personnel carriers. On the night of July 15, only 15 tanks and 25 APCs were used in Ankara, which is said to have been the epicenter of the coup attempt. This goes against standard TSK operational doctrine. Heavier military off-road vehicles and tactical wheeled armored vehicles were also not used. Smoke grenades, hand grenades, rocket launchers, machine guns, sniper rifles, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and the cannons and machine guns mounted on tanks and armored vehicles were not used either. Despite no sniper rifles being fired from the TSK inventory, individuals were reported to have been killed by sniper fire, raising questions about why this was covered up and why ballistic analyses were not conducted in detail.

The elite units and strike capabilities of the TSK were largely not employed by the alleged coup plotters. This is completely illogical.

In his testimony to the Parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission dated November 3, 2016, Retired Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ stated:

“Most of the elite units and strike capabilities of the TSK were not used by the coup plotters. Insufficient forces and small units were easily surrounded and neutralized by civilians and law enforcement.”

All military personnel on the ground on the night of July 15 were deployed with standard gear only, not with any additional weapons or equipment. No unit deployed with sniper rifles. Armored units did not utilize tank firepower (50-ton tanks can easily move across terrain; no truck or similar vehicle could obstruct a 50-ton tank). Despite the 58th Artillery Brigade having the capability to destroy strategic targets from its position using missile systems, this capability was not used.

Moreover, in Ankara and its districts, no personnel from major commands and logistical or technical units—such as the 4th Corps HQ, 11th Air Transport Base, Gendarmerie Aviation Command, Gendarmerie Training Command, Central Command, Cyber Defense, Army Doctrine and Training Command, Army Logistics, Air Logistics, Navy Supply, Air Force 3rd Maintenance Center, Army 45th Maintenance Center, Army 11th Supply Center, and the General Directorate of Mapping—participated in the coup.

Of the 76 F-16s available at Akıncı Air Base and the 53 attack helicopters at Army Aviation Command, none were used.

This clearly shows that no proper military force or plan was prepared for the so-called coup attempt before July 15. Therefore, characterizing July 15 as a coup attempt by a widespread faction within the TSK is irrational.

Any force planning a coup in Turkey would consider the police force under Erdoğan’s complete control. The police had approximately 270,000 personnel in total. The Ankara Police Department had about 17,000 personnel, the Istanbul Police Department about 38,000, and the Police Special Operations Unit—which conducted counter-operations—about 11,600 across the country.

If a well-organized group within the TSK truly intended to seize power with weapons, why did they mobilize such a limited and laughably insufficient force, despite the official claim that they failed?

The main indictment claims the coup time was moved up. Whether or not that happened, such an operation should have been backed by a solid plan and enough military power to counter the Ankara police force of 17,000 and hundreds of special operations personnel.

Ankara, as one of Turkey’s cities with the most military headquarters and installations, had approximately 50,000 military personnel. Almost all were under the command of generals later accused of participating in the coup. However, only a few thousand personnel in Ankara were involved that night.

Nationwide, only 20–30 generals were directly involved in the events of July 15. Yet out of approximately 350 generals, about 200 were dismissed, forced into retirement, or purged as alleged participants. Does this make sense?

Conclusion:

It is evident that the alleged coup attempt on July 15 lacked the necessary and appropriate force, vehicles, and equipment.

Umut Güçlüer

Sources:

[1]http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tsk-darbe-girisimine-katilan-personel-sayisini-acikladi,ns92udU75k2vw-1OlEK4gQ
[2] http://www.emekliasubaylar.org/haberler/item/1475-turk-silahli-kuvvetleri-personel-mevcutlari