The National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) Support for Groups Committing War Crimes

Under the AKP administration, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) has allegedly provided financial aid to individuals and groups that committed crimes against humanity, facilitated through some of its senior members. The most significant figure involved in organizing this process — including the actual delivery of funds — is reportedly Kemal Eskintan, the then-head of MİT’s Special Operations Department.

The sources of this financial support are said to include revenues from both legal and illegal activities, including:

· Allocations from the discretionary fund (which has increased approximately 30-fold in the last 20 years)
· Olive groves looted by groups under MİT control
· Other assets looted by MİT-backed groups
· Revenue from the sale of oil obtained from ISIS
· Profits from arms trafficking
· Commissions taken from trade in the IDLIB region
· Alleged commissions from drug trafficking routes

Financial Support to War Criminal and Ousted Leader Omar al-Bashir

In July 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for Omar al-Bashir’s arrest on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur. Despite this, the AKP government ignored the international ruling and continued its political and commercial relations with al-Bashir. In 2008, he was even hosted in Turkey at the invitation of then-President Abdullah Gül.
The ICC reiterated its decision in 2009, yet al-Bashir was invited again for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation summit in Istanbul on November 9, 2009. Turkey maintained its ties with Sudan, with mutual support between Erdoğan and al-Bashir continuing. In December 2017, President Erdoğan visited Sudan and publicly referred to al-Bashir as "my brother."
Beyond this visible support, sources claim MİT executive Kemal Eskintan organized cash deliveries via suitcases. A conversation between Eskintan — a former military officer — and a colleague reveals he traveled with cash on behalf of the Turkish state in 2013 and 2014, personally delivering it to al-Bashir. These trips were reportedly made using state-chartered aircraft under the pretense of intelligence cooperation or other official missions.

Support and Organization for Syrian Jihadist Groups Committing War Crimes

Before detailing the crimes, it’s important to clarify who these armed groups are. Chief among them are the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Al-Qaeda. However, both are fragmented entities. Especially in the FSA, many factions operate under local commanders without a unified structure.

According to numerous human rights reports, the following war crimes — as defined by the Rome Statute — were committed by armed groups and individuals fighting against the Syrian government and civilians:

1. Murder
2. Maiming
3. Cruel treatment
4. Torture
5. Outrages upon personal dignity
6. Taking hostages
7. Extrajudicial executions
8. Attacks on civilians
9. Attacks on protected persons/objects under the Geneva Conventions
10. Attacks on humanitarian or peacekeeping missions
11. Attacks on protected sites
12. Looting
13. Sexual violence
14. Recruitment/use of children under 15
15. Forcible displacement of civilians
16. Treacherous killing or wounding
17. Denial of mercy
18. Medical/scientific experimentation
19. Seizure or destruction of enemy property

A portion of these groups were reportedly controlled and financed by the Turkish state (specifically MİT). For a time, these operations on the ground were directed by Kemal Eskintan, codenamed "Abu Furkan" (a reference to his son’s name, Furkan), then-head of MİT’s Special Operations.

Source Interviews and Allegations

Sources who served in the region — requesting anonymity for security reasons — claim that:

· A de facto army was formed from jihadist groups by MİT.
· Regular salaries have been and continue to be paid.
· The number of paid personnel has exceeded 100,000.

Question: What is the reliability of this information? (E.g., rumor, solid source, documents, eyewitness testimony)
Answer: These anti-regime elements in northern Syria were initially supported by the U.S. in 2013. Later, Turkey began funding them through its discretionary budget. Senior commanders in the region were aware, but by nature, no official records exist.
Question: What was the purpose of these deployments?
Answer: Turkish officials appointed various roles in northern Syria: religious leaders (muftis), post officers, district governors, and health workers — some of whom were Turkish citizens. FSA members also staffed border checkpoints.
Question: Were there paid mercenaries?
Answer: Yes. Turkey paid their salaries. Universities and hospitals were established. Turkish lira is the currency used, and employees report to Turkish district governors. Effectively, a parallel and illegal state was established in northern Syria.
Question: What was the purpose of appointing muftis?
Answer: These were part of bureaucratic appointments, mostly selected through party structures. Those appointed receive overseas allowances and remain silent for the benefits.
Question: How much were they paid, and how was it financed?
Answer: Each individual was paid around $1,500/month.
Main financing sources:
· Discretionary funds (which showed an extraordinary increase):
Year Budget Revenue Discretionary Fund
2003 103 Billion TL 98.3 Million TL
2021 1.4 Trillion TL 2.7 Billion TL
While the budget increased by 13.6 times, the discretionary fund rose by 28 times.
Illegal funding sources included:
· Arms trafficking
· Smuggling
· Looting agricultural lands and oil fields
Additionally, free electricity is provided by Turkey.
Question: For what purposes was this unofficial army used?
Answer: It was used not only in Syria but also in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. It allegedly played a role on the night of July 15 (2016 coup attempt). Representatives of terrorist organizations operating in Syria frequently attended meetings at MİT headquarters.
Question: Did organizing this force exceed MİT’s legal authority?
Answer: While the law allows MİT to meet with organizations, forming and paying a parallel army exceeds its legal mandate.
Question: Has this unofficial force committed war crimes? Any examples?
Answer: Regional media and reports from 2018–2019 document looting and home seizures by these groups.
Question: What was Kemal Eskintan’s role in this?
Answer: He organized the operations. Known by the codename “Abu Furkan,” Eskintan directly communicated with FSA-linked leaders, guided them on behalf of the regime, and had enough clout to call Erdoğan or Hakan Fidan via video call. He even arranged meetings with Erdoğan and reportedly arranged encounters with escorts for the so-called jihadist leaders in hotels.
There were secret border gates controlled by MİT along the Syrian frontier, aside from official ones. These were guarded only by a single sergeant, and MİT operatives could transport unidentified individuals in both directions without inspection.
One such gate, known as Akıncı Gate, is located about 5 km east of Öncüpınar. Other gates exist in areas like Idlib (e.g., Admah) and Afrin. Numerous events have occurred involving these gates. For instance, in one bombing, a MİT operative was killed at one of these gates — an incident that was never reported.
Talking about the trucks transporting weapons to Syria is considered taboo. Since it could lead to international criminal prosecution, there's discomfort about discussing the issue publicly. States like Russia have even used evidence of these arms shipments as blackmail when Turkey diverged from their geopolitical orbit.

Dilaver Derviş