Corrupt Government, Corrupt Bureaucrat, and War in the Middle East

A leader whose throne/chair is shaking in the Middle East does not refrain from taking up arms. This is the tragic fate of these lands. Feeding on existing blood and war is part of this. In corrupt administrations, this is seen as a right or an opportunity. In this article, we will focus on Erdoğan’s policy on Syria and a bureaucrat actively involved in the looting there.

Palestine

The historic response of Sultan Abdulhamid II to Jewish representatives who wanted to establish a state in Jerusalem and its surroundings is well known. The Sultan, who tried to keep the collapsing empire together, is also remembered among the sultans of the Ottoman despotism era. Undoubtedly, Abdulhamid actively used the Yıldız Intelligence Agency both domestically and in foreign policy. It is rumored that one day the Sultan told his grand vizier, who complained about the intelligence expenses straining the budget, “We are waging the cheapest war, Pasha!” The “Neo-Ottomanism” discourse, which was tried to be developed in Turkish foreign policy after 2010, also brought intelligence policies reminiscent of the Abdulhamid era. Today, Turkey is engaged in a war abroad similar to the one 100 years ago. What these struggles are for remains unclear. What is certain is that the future will be more exhausting and dangerous.

The Erdoğan administration considers Hamas, which follows an Islamist line like itself, a serious interlocutor in Palestine. In recent years, Turkey has been among the countries most frequently visited and stayed in by Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Not only him, but nearly half of Hamas’s political leadership has long been in Turkey, being highly regarded under the patronage of the Presidency. If we consider the current crisis, what is the Erdoğan administration’s influence on the bloodshed in the Israel-Hamas tension?

Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, or Palestine. Since the moment the government sank into corruption (and suspended the rule of law), Turkey’s motivation in its Middle East and Africa policies has undergone a noticeable change. This is most clearly observed in the Syrian crisis.  To fully understand the Erdoğan administration’s policy in the Middle East or especially Palestine today, it is helpful to look at Turkey’s 10-year adventure in Syria.

Wheel of Rent

In the autumn of 2020, Nuri Gökhan Bozkır gave an interview to one of Ukraine’s popular journalists in a small café on the east side of the Dnieper River in Kyiv. Bozkır usually did not conduct such meetings at his own Levo Restaurant. But those who wanted to reach him would contact the head waiter of the restaurant. During the interview, Bozkır’s phone rang and a short break was taken. Although not at that moment, when the journalist listened to the recording device—left on by accident—later that evening, he understood the content of the call. Bozkır’s contact in Syria had informed him that one of the radical organizations wanted to purchase three helicopters. Bozkır had replied, “Tell him it’ll be costly, a lot of people need to be paid off.” The group must have been financially sound, as Bozkır agreed to fulfill the request within minutes. The Syrian civil war had created new conditions in the region, and brokers, bribers, profiteers, and looters had immediately taken their places in the market. In order to operate under these conditions, one needed to “distribute” money.

When pressure mounted on Gökhan Nuri Bozkır, he sometimes posted photos and videos (evidence) on social media as if to threaten certain individuals. Perhaps that is why he was left untouched for quite some time. His current fate is unknown, but what remains in people’s minds are the images he shared: suitcases full of money, crates of ammunition, a variety of weapons, a luxurious lifestyle on one hand, and truckloads of potatoes and onions on the other. Bozkır was one of the intermediaries used in the foreign logistical operations of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), a cog in the machine of theft, looting, murder, and national/international profiteering that makes up the hidden side of what is called “the state’s covert operations.” In this article, we will primarily focus on someone above Bozkır—someone at the peak of the bureaucracy.

Kemal Eskintan

In recent years, amidst scandals shaking MİT, he managed to rise unscathed from the games of thrones. He is a former soldier who knows how things work in the state and is currently the head of the Organization’s Special Operations Department. He speaks Arabic, is very active in the field, but rarely appears in the media. He is not as successful as perceived. He is a man of dirty business. In Libya, he is referred to as “Turkey’s Qasem Soleimani” and is at the center of the Erdoğan administration’s Syria policy (or profiteering). He is one of those managing money and organizations in the region on behalf of Turkey. Sometimes a courier, sometimes a trustee. He has judicial immunity and is protected from courts. His greatest ambition was to become the head of MİT. Although that goal has currently stalled, he seems determined to try every path.

Mrs. Eskintan, like her husband, is also among those who rose rapidly. She climbed from being a tenured engineer at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to a consultancy, then to a no-show staff position. Not only their positions, but also their wealth has skyrocketed. Naturally, they moved from the ministry’s official housing to a private villa with a swimming pool (though they didn’t vacate their old apartment). While the extent of their assets is currently unknown, Kemal Eskintan’s name appears among the owners of a luxury villa complex.

Eskintan’s Role in Syria

After more than a decade of civil war, the crime-based economy in Syria has almost become institutionalized While the enforcers may vary (ranging from large and small groups controlling different regions to proxy actors), nearly the same conditions prevail across the board. Human trafficking, forced labor, sex work, child soldiers, slavery, and revenues from extortion, protection, and taxes imposed by armed groups are among the illegal trade practices directly affecting Syrian society. The embezzlement and parcelling of humanitarian aid and grants, local and international arms trade, seizure, transport, and sale of underground and surface resources (most notably the Aleppo Sheikh Najjar industrial zones and olive groves), fuel smuggling as the most profitable income stream, transit fees from heroin and cocaine transfers, cannabis and Captagon production and sales have created a massive narco-economy. Even rare animal, plant, and artifact smuggling becomes a minor detail in this system.

Like other groups in Syria, the over 100 factions operating under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army (SMO, formerly the Free Syrian Army—FSA), which acts under the command of Turkey’s MIT, have for years fed off the illegal economic order described above. In addition to all these revenue streams, it is worth mentioning the state funds transferred to the region.  The amount of money transferred has increased in parallel with the growth in covert budgets and MİT’s annual allocations.  Corruption by personnel protected by judicial immunity occasionally surfaces as well. A few years ago, lack of oversight in the field led to the embezzlement of covert funds, which eventually sparked a conflict between cliques within MIT.

Kemal Eskintan, the Head of the Special Operations Department, is one of the key figures at the center of both the economic order maintained in the areas controlled by MİT-affiliated groups and the flow of state funds into the region. In the field, he is known—much like a mafia extra in old Turkish Yeşilçam films—for piling stacks of cash onto tables to distribute to those lined up before him, or, conversely, collecting the proceeds of profiteering.

One Man’s Victory

Turkey’s Syria policy is not a triumph but a disaster. So many martyrs, veterans, various overseas operations under different names, piles of money spent, and thousands of radical fighters whose future actions are unknown. No tangible results: the “Kurdish corridor” is still on the table, Assad hasn’t been overthrown and is certainly no friend of ours. The Turkish army can neither hold its ground nor fully withdraw from occupied regions. On top of that, there are millions of refugees. Security risks, deteriorating public order, bombings, economic crisis, and dozens of other damages. Meanwhile, a victory for the “One Man” is taking place in Syria. Erdoğan is getting richer, Eskintan is getting richer, and the accomplices of this administration are content. Turkey continues to suffer from this defeat.

Conclusion

Yaşar Kemal once said, “Wars first corrupt leaders, then the people.” In the last ten years, the covert wars waged by the Erdoğan administration at home and abroad have corrupted both society and its leaders, and have elevated corrupted figures like Eskintan to high positions in state institutions. Step by step, we are heading toward the institutional and moral collapse of a state.
 

Faruk Yılmaz